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Forcible Arms Control: Preemptive Attacks on
Nuclear Facilities
David Sloss*
INTRODUCTION
A former colleague of mine worked for most of his adult life as a career
military officer. Toward the end of his career, he was assigned to work as an
arms control inspector. In that capacity, he personally oversaw the destruction
of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of weapons. He told me that, in just a couple
of years as an arms control inspector, he had successfully eliminated many times
more enemy weapons than he could possibly have destroyed in his entire career
as a military officer. The lesson is clear: arms control is war by other means.
But if arms control is war by other means, one could also say, to
paraphrase Clausewitz, that war is arms control by other means.' One key
objective of arms control is to reduce or eliminate certain military capabilities of
an adversary or a potential adversary. The same is true with respect to war.
Hence, the question arises: in what circumstances is military force, or the threat
of force, likely to be more effective than arms control as a mechanism for
constraining the military capabilities of a potential adversary?
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ("NPT") is the principal arms
control mechanism for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.2 A key
weakness of the NPT is that it permits non-nuclear-weapon states parties to
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Clausewitz famously stated that "war is politics by other means." Carl von Clausewitz, On
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War 605 (Princeton 1976) (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds and trans).
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21 UST 483 (1970) (hereinafter NPT).
The NPT divides states into nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. Under
the NPT, there are five nuclear weapon states: the United States, Russia, China, France, and
the United Kingdom. "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Id
at art I. "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes ... not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Id at
art II.
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accumulate a stockpile of weapons-grade nuclear material, provided that the
nuclear material is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA")
safeguards.3 The vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT
have not demonstrated any interest in producing a stockpile of weapons-grade
nuclear material. However, there have been a few exceptions.4 Any state that has
acquired a stockpile of weapons-grade nuclear material has thereby overcome
the key technological hurdle on the path to production of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT could acquire a legal
stockpile of weapons-grade nuclear material under IAEA safeguards, announce
its withdrawal from the NPT, and then proceed to manufacture nuclear
weapons.
Given the potential for a non-nuclear-weapon state party to withdraw from
the NPT after acquiring a stockpile of weapons-grade nuclear material, and given
the tremendous destructive potential of nuclear weapons, the production of
weapons-grade nuclear material by additional states-even under IAEA
safeguards-poses a significant threat to international peace and security. Under
the UN Charter, the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security."5 Accordingly, members of the
Security Council should consider options involving the threat and/or use of
military force to prevent non-nuclear-weapon states from producing weaponsgrade nuclear material.
Specifically, the five permanent members of the Security Council should
adopt a common declaratory policy in support of preemptive attacks against
3

4

The International Atomic Energy Agency is the international organization charged with
safeguarding nuclear materials to help verify non-nuclear-weapon states parties' compliance
with their NPT obligations. Id at art III, 1 1. The IAEA was created by the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, 8 UST 1093 (1957) (hereinafter IAEA Statute).
See David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and
Highy Enriched Uranium, 1992 168-90 (Oxford 1993) (providing a comprehensive accounting
of global stockpiles of weapons-useable nuclear materials, as of 1992). Albright divides states'
nuclear stockpiles into five categories: (1) military inventories in the five nuclear weapon
states; (2) civil inventories in states with advanced civilian nuclear programs (primarily states
in Western Europe, North America, East Asia, and the former Soviet Union); (3) de facto
nuclear weapon states (Israel, India, and Pakistan); (4) countries of concern (Iraq, North
Korea, Iran, and Algeria); (5) countries backing away from nuclear weapons (Argentina,
Brazil, South Africa, and Taiwan). With the exception of Taiwan, which is not eligible to be
an NPT party, the states in categories 4 and 5 are all non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the
NPT. According to Albright, they have all accumulated, or tried to accumulate, weaponsgrade nuclear material at some point in time. See id at 168-91. Category 2 also includes
several non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT that have sizeable nuclear material
inventories, but the vast majority of their nuclear materials is not in a form that would be
readily useable for nuclear weapons.
United Nations Charter, art 24(1). The Security Council consists of fifteen Member States,
including five permanent members, and ten nonpermanent members. Id at art 23(1). The five
permanent members are the five nuclear weapon states: the United States, Russia, China,
France, and the United Kingdom.
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plutonium production reactors, reprocessing plants, and uranium enrichment
facilities in states that have not previously produced a stockpile of weaponsgrade nuclear material. These three types of nuclear facilities are the critical
production facilities that a state needs in order to produce weapons-grade
nuclear material. If the Security Council authorized military intervention before a
state introduced nuclear material into such a facility, a well-executed surgical
strike would deal a substantial setback to a proliferant state's nuclear weapons
program, while avoiding significant casualties. Moreover, if the five permanent
members of the Security Council adopted a common declaratory policy in
support of preemptive attacks, it might deter potential proliferators from even
attempting to construct plutonium production reactors, reprocessing plants, or
uranium enrichment facilities.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I briefly describes the
technology for production of weapons-grade nuclear material and the
radiological effects of military attacks on nuclear production facilities. Part II
offers a policy justification for using military force to prevent states from
constructing plutonium production reactors, reprocessing plants, or uranium
enrichment facilities. Part II also discusses the case of North Korea to illustrate
the application of the proposed policy framework. Part III contends that
targeted conventional strikes against nuclear production facilities, absent Security
Council authorization, would violate the UN Charter. Part IV recommends that
the five permanent members of the Security Council adopt a common
declaratory policy in support of preemptive attacks on nuclear facilities.
I. NUCLEAR MATERIALS PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY
6
A. PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS-GRADE NUCLEAR MATERIAL

A state' that seeks to acquire nuclear weapons must obtain weapons-grade
nuclear material-either highly-enriched uranium ("HEU") or separated
plutonium. The acquisition of weapons-grade nuclear material is the most
significant technological hurdle that a state must overcome in order to obtain
nuclear weapons. Neither HEU nor plutonium is a naturally occurring material;
both are manmade. For the purposes of this analysis, I will assume that it is not
possible to buy weapons-grade nuclear material.8 Therefore, a state that wants to
6
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For a more detailed discussion of nuclear materials production technologies, see Albright,
Berkhout, and Walker, World Inventoy ofPlutonium, 1992 at 9-21 (cited in note 4).
There are significant proliferation concerns associated with the prospect that certain nonstate
entities might acquire weapons-grade nuclear material. However, this Article focuses on the
nuclear proliferation risks associated with proliferant states.
In fact, there is a nontrivial risk that a proliferant state might seek to purchase nuclear
material suitable for use in nuclear weapons. However, the risks associatel with black market
sales of weapons-grade nuclear material are well beyond the scope of this Article.
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acquire nuclear weapons must build facilities that are capable of producing either
HEU or separated plutonium.
To manufacture HEU for nuclear weapons, a state need only construct one
facility: a uranium enrichment plant. Natural uranium is a common element that
is mined in many countries throughout the world. A state cannot use natural
uranium to produce nuclear weapons, though, because natural uranium contains
more than ninety-nine percent U-238, and less than one percent U-235. In
contrast, weapons-grade HEU contains more than ninety percent U-235. Thus,
to convert natural uranium into HEU it is necessary to separate the U-235
isotope from the U-238 isotope. This process is known as uranium enrichment.
Aside from its role in nuclear weapons production, uranium enrichment
technology is also used to produce low-enriched uranium ("LEU") for civilian
nuclear power plants. The LEU that is used in civilian nuclear reactors usually
contains about three percent U-235-far too low a concentration of U-235 to be
9
useable for nuclear weapons.
To manufacture plutonium for nuclear weapons, a state must construct
two distinct facilities: a nuclear reactor and a reprocessing plant. Plutonium is
produced by irradiating uranium fuel in a nuclear reactor. Civilian nuclear power
reactors produce plutonium as a byproduct, but the plutonium produced in
civilian power reactors is not well suited for use in nuclear weapons.' ° Similarly,
there are many nuclear research reactors throughout the world that produce
small amounts of plutonium, but they are not designed primarily to produce
plutonium. Nuclear reactors that are designed and operated to optimize
1
plutonium production are known as plutonium production reactors. '
The plutonium that is produced in a reactor cannot be used to make
nuclear weapons until the spent fuel is removed from the reactor and the
plutonium is separated from the spent fuel. To separate plutonium from spent

9
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There are almost two hundred nuclear reactors throughout the world that use HEU fuel. See
Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium, 1992 at 144 (cited in note 4).
Many non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT possess such reactors. See id at 235-37.
A non-nuclear-weapon state that wanted to acquire a nuclear weapon could, in theory,
extract HEU from reactor fuel to make a nuclear weapon. However, the quantity of HEU
available from reactor fuel is generally quite small-in many states, it would not be sufficient
for even one nuclear weapon.
The plutonium that is produced in civilian nuclear power reactors is referred to as "reactorgrade plutonium." In contrast, the plutonium produced in a plutonium production reactor is
"weapons-grade plutonium." It is technically feasible to make a nuclear weapon with reactorgrade plutonium. However, a state that was committed to developing nuclear weapons would
presumably want to use weapons-grade plutonium.
The technical characteristics that distinguish plutonium production reactors from research
reactors and power reactors are difficult to define. At the margins, experts might disagree as
to whether a particular reactor is properly classified as a plutonium production reactor. For
purposes of this analysis, though, I will disregard the definitional problem.
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fuel, a state must construct a reprocessing plant. The output from a reprocessing
plant is known as "separated plutonium."
In sum, any state that seeks to acquire nuclear weapons must construct
either: (a) a uranium enrichment facility, or (b) both a plutonium production
reactor and a spent fuel reprocessing plant.
B. RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ATTACKS ON
12
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
All nuclear materials emit some radiation. However, there are significant
differences between materials that emit low-level radiation and materials that
emit high-level radiation. Experts disagree about the long-term effects of
exposure to low-level radiation. However, there is no question that the biological
and environmental effects of low-level radiation are not nearly as dramatic as the
effects of exposure to high-level radiation. Uranium that has not been irradiated
in a reactor emits only low-level radiation. Uranium enrichment facilities
generally contain uranium that has not been irradiated in a reactor.
Consequently, a conventional military attack on a uranium enrichment facility is
likely to release fairly low levels of radiation, even if substantial quantities of
uranium are present in the facility at the time of the attack. 3
When uranium is irradiated in a reactor, some uranium atoms capture
additional neutrons. This neutron capture results in the production of
plutonium. Unlike uranium, plutonium emits high-level radiation, which is
extremely hazardous to human health. Other uranium atoms, instead of
capturing additional neutrons, split into two parts when they are subjected to
radiation. The splitting of the atom is known as "nuclear fission." Nuclear
fission yields large amounts of energy and resultant "fission products." Many of
those fission products are highly radioactive. Iodine-131, strontium-90, and
cesium-137, in particular, pose severe biological and environmental risks. Once a
reactor "goes critical," it begins to produce both plutonium and highly
radioactive fission products. The plutonium and fission products remain in the
fuel until the fuel undergoes reprocessing-a process that separates the
plutonium from the uranium, and separates both from the fission products.
If a conventional attack against an operational nuclear power reactor is
intended merely to disrupt its electrical generating capacity, it is possible to

12

For detailed analysis of the radiological effects of attacks on nuclear facilities, see Bennett

Ramberg, Destruction of Nuclear Eneig Faci-ilies in War The Problem and the Implications
13

(Lexington 1980).
Although a conventional attack on a uranium enrichment facility is likely to have limited
radiological effects, such an attack might, depending on the nature of the production process,
produce other significant environmental damage.
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conduct the attack in a manner that avoids release of high-level radiation. 14
However, if a conventional attack against an operational plutonium production
reactor is intended to halt the production of plutonium, it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to achieve the intended military objective without releasing large
amounts of high-level radiation. The same is true with respect to an operational
reprocessing plant. Therefore, a conventional military attack against an
operational plutonium production reactor, or an operational reprocessing plant,
is likely to cause catastrophic loss of life and severe radiological damage to the
surrounding environment.
A nuclear reactor that is not yet operational does not contain highly
radioactive materials. The same is true with respect to a reprocessing plant.
Hence, a conventional military attack on a nuclear reactor or a reprocessing
plant that is not yet operational is likely to cause minimal radiological damage.
Thus, if the Security Council were to authorize an attack on a reactor or
reprocessing plant, the optimal time would be shortly before nuclear material is
first introduced into the facility. By attacking before the facility is operational, a
well-executed attack could deal a significant technological setback to a state's
nuclear weapons program without causing
substantial radiological
contamination.
II. PREEMPTIVE ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES:
A POLICY ANALYSIS
Part II is divided into three sections. The first section considers, in the
abstract, the policy justification for preemptive attacks on nuclear facilities. The
second section describes the development of North Korea's nuclear program.
The final section illustrates the application of the proposed policy framework by
analyzing the application of the framework to the specific case of North Korea.
A. A PROPOSED POLICY FRAMEWORK
Imagine a graph with a vertical axis that measures the potential threat a
state poses to its adversaries, and a horizontal axis that measures various military
capabilities. If the horizontal axis measured conventional weapons capabilities,
the graph would show a line that sloped gently upward. A graph portraying
biological and/or chemical weapons capabilities would have a similar
appearance, except that the line would have a steeper slope, and the transition
from zero weapons to one weapon would show a significant discontinuity. But if
the graph depicted a state's nuclear weapons capability, the transition from zero
to one weapon would show a much greater discontinuity. In short, the
acquisition of a single nuclear weapon by a state that previously possessed no
14

See Ramberg, Destrucion of NuclearEnegy Failiiesin War at 18 (cited in note 12).
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such weapon constitutes a quantum leap in military capacity that is unlike any
other single technological development. Therefore, the international community
might reasonably conclude that the acquisition of a single nuclear weapon by
State P-a nuclear proliferant state that did not previously possess nuclear
weapons-constitutes a "threat to the peace," or a "breach of the peace."' 5
Moreover, the international community has a substantial interest in preventing
State P from acquiring its first nuclear weapon.
Hence, the question arises, at what point in the weapons development
process is it too late to prevent State P from acquiring its first nuclear weapon?
The short answer is this: once State P has produced enough HEU or separated
plutonium for a single nuclear weapon, other states can use a combination of
carrots and sticks to try to dissuade State P from manufacturing a nuclear
weapon, but if State P is determined to proceed with its nuclear weapons
program, there are no realistic forcible options, short of a full-scale invasion, to
prevent State P from manufacturing nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if
other states intervened militarily before State P produced enough HEU or
separated plutonium for a nuclear weapon, a well-executed surgical strike against
a nuclear reactor, reprocessing plant, and/or uranium enrichment facility would
deal a substantial setback to State P's nuclear weapons program. To avoid
significant casualties and widespread environmental damage, the surgical strike
would have to be conducted before nuclear material is introduced into the
facility.' 6
In light of the above, there is a strong policy justification for preemptive
attacks on nuclear facilities where the following factors are present:
"
State P has completed, or almost completed, construction of either a
uranium enrichment facility, a plutonium production reactor or a
reprocessing facility;
*
diplomatic efforts have failed to persuade State P to halt construction
of the subject nuclear facility or facilities;
"
there is evidence that State P seeks to acquire nuclear weapons; and
"
there is evidence that State P will soon introduce nuclear material into
the subject facility or facilities.

15

16

Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has the responsibility to "determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." United
Nations Charter, art 39. Such a determination by the Security Council is a necessary predicate
for any subsequent collective security action under Chapter VII of the Charter.
As noted above, this statement is technically accurate with respect to plutonium production
reactors and reprocessing plants, but not with respect to uranium enrichment facilities. See
Part I.B. Even so, if the goal is to prevent State P from acquiring a nuclear weapon, the
attack on a uranium enrichment facility would have to occur before State P produced enough
HEU for one nuclear weapon. Moreover, uncertainties about the pace of production would
provide a strong incentive to strike early-perhaps even before the facility is operational.
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B. NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 17

During the 1960s, North Korea constructed a small nuclear research
facility at Nyongbyong, with assistance from the Soviet Union. In 1979, the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPRK") began construction, also at
Nyongbyong, of an indigenously designed 5 MW(e) graphite moderated reactor
(a plutonium production reactor). The 5 MW(e) reactor became operational in
1986. By that time, North Korea had begun construction of two larger graphitemoderated reactors: a 50 MW(e) reactor and a 200 MW(e) reactor. In about
1987, North Korea began construction of a reprocessing facility at Nyongbyong.
North Korea probably removed some spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) reactor in
1989 and later separated some plutonium from that spent fuel."8
On December 12, 1985, North Korea became a party to the NPT. As an
NPT party, North Korea was obligated to accept IAEA safeguards with respect
to all nuclear material "in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of
'1 9
such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere."
Under the terms of the treaty, North Korea was obligated to commence
negotiation of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA on or before the date on
which it became a party to the treaty, and to conclude the safeguards agreement
"not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. 20 In
fact, North Korea did not conclude the required safeguards agreement with the
IAEA until April 10, 1992, almost five years behind schedule. While negotiations
proceeded, North Korea continued to operate the 5 MW(e) plutonium
production reactor-without application of IAEA safeguards.
In accordance with the safeguards agreement, in May 1992 the DPRK
submitted an initial report on all nuclear material subject to safeguards. In that
report the DPRK claimed that it had conducted small-scale reprocessing in
1990, when it had separated less than one hundred grams of plutonium from
spent fuel discharged from the 5 MW(e) reactor. However, the IAEA discovered
discrepancies between the DPRK's initial declaration and the observations of
the IAEA inspectors. The discrepancies hinted at the existence of an unknown
17

18
19

20

Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this section is derived from the following
sources: International Atomic Energy Agency, Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards (Jan 8,
2003), available online at <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Prelease/2002/medadvise_052.shtml> (visited Mar 2, 2003); David Fischer, History of the InternationalAtomic
Energy Agency, 1997, excerpted in International Atomic Energy Agency, The DPRK's Violation

of Its NPT Safeguards Agreement With the IAEA, available online at <http://www.iaea.or.at/
worldatom/Press/Focus/laeaDprk/dprk.pdf> (visited Mar 2, 2003).
Congressional Research Service, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons
Program 5 (updated Jan 7, 2003).
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at art Ill, 1 (cited in note 2). In 1977,
North Korea had concluded a more limited safeguards agreement with the IAEA that
covered a small research reactor supplied by the Soviet Union.
Id at art 111, 4.
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quantity of separated plutonium that the DPRK had failed to declare in its initial
report. In an effort to resolve the discrepancy, the IAEA requested a "special
inspection," as provided for in the safeguards agreement. When the DPRK
refused the request, the IAEA Board of Governors determined, on April 1,
1993, that North Korea had violated the safeguards agreement.
The stand-off between North Korea and the IAEA continued throughout
1993 and into 1994. During this period, the IAEA's main concern was to obtain
an accurate inventory of the quantity of plutonium produced in the 5 MW(e)
reactor, and the quantity of plutonium separated from spent fuel in the
reprocessing plant. In May 1994, North Korea removed spent fuel from the 5
MW(e) reactor, without IAEA inspectors present, in a manner that made it
virtually impossible for the IAEA to gain an accurate estimate of past plutonium
production in the reactor.2' Meanwhile, the DPRK continued to refuse
permission for a special inspection that might have enabled the IAEA to
determine more precisely the quantity of separated plutonium produced in the
reprocessing plant.
On October 21, 1994, representatives of the United States and the DPRK
signed a document known as the "Agreed Framework., 22 Under the Agreed
Framework, the United States agreed to make arrangements for the provision to
the DPRK of nuclear power plants with a total generating capacity of 2,000
MW(e) by a target date of 2003, and to deliver 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually
in the interim. In exchange, the DPRK agreed:
*
to freeze operation of its 5 MW(e) plutonium production reactor and
reprocessing plant, and to halt construction of the two larger reactors,
within one month after signature of the Agreed Framework;
*
to allow the IAEA to monitor the freeze;
*
to complete dismantlement of the 5 MW(e) reactor, the reprocessing
plant, and the two larger reactors upon completion of the nuclear
power plants; and
*
after construction of a significant portion of the nuclear power plants,
but before delivery of key nuclear components, to take all necessary
steps to enable the IAEA to verify the accuracy and completeness of
the DPRK's declared inventory of nuclear material subject to
safeguards.

21

22

According to the Congressional Research Service, the DPRK removed about 8,000 fuel rods
in May 1994, "which could be reprocessed into enough plutonium for 4-5 nuclear weapons."
CRS Issue Brief for Congress at 2 (cited in note 18).
Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the United States of America and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, available online at <http://www.iaea.or.at/
worldatom/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf> (visited Mar 2, 2003).

Spring 2003

Chicago Journal of InternationalLaw

In effect, the United States decided that it could accept continued
uncertainty about past plutonium production in exchange for a verifiable
commitment to halt ongoing plutonium production.
For several years, it appeared that the Agreed Framework was working.
Construction of the nuclear power plants was behind schedule, but oil deliveries
continued. Meanwhile, North Korea had halted its plutonium production
program. Then, on October 16, 2002, the United States announced that the
DPRK had been conducting a secret program to enrich uranium for nuclear
weapons. In response to this revelation, the United States, Japan, and South
Korea decided to suspend deliveries of heavy oil. On December 12, 2002, the
DPRK retaliated by notifying the IAEA that it had decided to lift the freeze on
its nuclear facilities. Ten days later, the North Koreans escalated the
confrontation by removing IAEA monitoring equipment from the reprocessing
plant, thereby enabling them to reprocess the spent fuel and produce separated
plutonium in the absence of IAEA safeguards. On December 27, 2002, the
DPRK ordered IAEA inspectors to leave the country, and in January 2003
North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT. The IAEA Board of
Governors subsequently referred the matter to the UN Security Council. As of
this writing, it is unclear whether the international community will be able to
persuade North Korea either to refreeze its plutonium production program, or
to halt its uranium enrichment program.
C. ATTACKING NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES
The recent revelations about North Korea's secret uranium enrichment
program, and its decision to lift the freeze on plutonium production, have
prompted renewed calls for military attacks on nuclear facilities to terminate
North Korea's nuclear weapons program. However, the policy framework
outlined above suggests that the military option should have been pursued in
1986, before North Korea's plutonium production reactor was operational.2 3 At
present, there are three sets of reasons why a military option is no longer viable.
First, and most importantly, North Korea now has a nuclear deterrent.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated publicly in August 2001 that "North
Korea possesse[s] enough plutonium to produce two to three, maybe even four
to five nuclear warheads."24 Thus, any proposal for a conventional attack on the
DPRK's nuclear facilities must account for the possibility that North Korea

23

Of course, the Cold War had not ended in 1986. Accordingly, unilateral military action by the
United States would have risked confrontation with the Soviet Union. Moreover, under thenprevailing geopolitical conditions, collective action by the Security Council would not have
been politically feasible. In short, North Korea's nuclear weapons program was fueled, in

part, by political paralysis among the permanent members of the Security Council.
24

CRS Issue Brief for Congress at 6 (cited in note 18).
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might launch a nuclear counterattack on Seoul, or on a US military base in South
Korea. Even if Secretary Rumsfeld has overestimated the DPRK's nuclear
capability, and notwithstanding the United States' overwhelming military
superiority, the fear of a North Korean nuclear reprisal is a very powerful
deterrent.
Second, the risk of causing severe radiological damage also provides a
strong disincentive against certain possible attack scenarios. As noted above, a
surgical strike against North Korea's uranium enrichment facility is unlikely to
cause significant radiological damage. The same is true with respect to the 50
MW(e) and 200 MW(e) graphite-moderated reactors, which have never been
operational. However, an attack directed at the 5 MW(e) reactor and/or the
reprocessing plant would probably cause substantial civilian casualties and
widespread environmental damage.2 5 Indeed, the resultant loss of life and
environmental damage might be sufficiently grave that an attack could be
considered a violation of the laws of war. 26 Even assuming that such an attack
was legal, humanitarian considerations weigh heavily against any attack that
would cause severe radiological damage. Finally, the expected negative political
repercussions might be sufficient to deter such an attack.
Third, South Korea recently elected a new President, Mr. Roh Moo Hyun,
who favors a more conciliatory approach to North Korea.27 Mr. Roh would
probably oppose any proposal for military action against North Korea. The
Security Council is unlikely to approve military action over South Korean
objections, and the United States would be reluctant to undertake unilateral
action in the face of South Korean opposition. Thus, in the current political
climate, proposals for a conventional attack on North Korean nuclear facilities
are unrealistic.
25

26

27

See notes 11-13 and accompanying text. If there was no nuclear material present in the
5 MW(e) reactor or the reprocessing plant during the eight year "freeze"-which was in
effect from November 1994 until December 2002-and if those facilities were attacked
before nuclear material was reintroduced, the radiological effects of an attack would be
mitigated to some extent. Absent access to detailed technical information, it is not possible to
determine the extent of mitigation.
Protocol No I to the Geneva Conventions, 1125 UNTS 3 (1977), prohibits "[a]n attack
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." Id at art 51, 5. Moreover, those who
plan an attack are obligated to "[t]ake all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects." Id at art 57, 2(a). Finally, "[i]t
is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment." Id
at art 35, 3. The United States is not a party to Protocol I. However, some of its provisions
may be reflective of customary international law. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 ICJ 226, 241-43 (uly 8).
See Howard W. French, SeoulMay Loosen Its Ties to the U.S., NY Times Al (Dec 20, 2002).
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III. PREEMPTIVE ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS

Before initiating a military strike against a proliferant state's nuclear
facilities, policymakers would have to consider the international legal
ramifications of such an attack. Absent authorization by the UN Security
Council, there are two plausible legal justifications for a preemptive attack. One
possible justification relies on a narrow interpretation of the legal prohibition
against the use of force, which is embodied in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
The second possible justification relies on a broad reading of the right to selfdefense under Article 51 of the Charter. Part III discusses both possible
justifications.28 Part IV considers possible collective action by the Security
Council.
A. ARTICLE 2(4) AND PREEMPTIVE ATTACKS ON
NUCLEAR FACILITIES

On June 7, 1981, Israel launched an aerial attack that destroyed an Iraqi
nuclear reactor located near Baghdad. The UN Security Council strongly
condemned the attack as a "clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations
and the norms of international conduct., 29 The Security Council resolution
invoked Article 2(4) of the Charter, which prohibits the use of force "against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."3
Generally speaking, academic commentary on Article 2(4) is divided
between those who support a broad interpretation, and others who support a
narrow interpretation. The majority view is that Article 2(4) prohibits any transboundary use of armed force, unless that use of force can be justified as an act
of self-defense or is authorized by the Security Council (the "broad
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There are two other possible legal justifications for preemptive attacks, which will not be
discussed in detail. One leading scholar has argued that the UN Charter's prohibition against
the use of force has been so greatly eroded by inconsistent state practice that it is no longer
binding law. See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Se/f-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 Harv J L & Pub Poly 539 (2002). Another recent
article contends that the best rationale for preemptive attacks is that states have an inherent
"Right to life," which "prevents the random annihilation of their populations from weapons
of mass destruction in the hands of unstable regimes." Major Michael Lacey, Sejf-Defense or
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10 Ind Intl & Comp L Rev 293, 294
Seff-Denial: The Proliferation
(2000).
Security Council Res No 487, UN Doc No S/RES/487 (1981).

United Nations Charter, art 2(4) ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
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interpretation").3 Advocates of the broad interpretation rely, in part, on the
negotiating history of the UN Charter, which suggests that the phrase "against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" was not intended
to restrict the Charter's broad prohibition against the transboundary use of
force.32 Key decisions by the International Court of Justice also support the
broad interpretation of Article 2(4)." For those who adhere to the broad
interpretation, the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor was a clear violation of
Article 2(4).
In an article published shortly after the Israeli attack, Professor Anthony
D'Amato challenged that view; his analysis illustrates the narrow interpretation
of Article 2(4). 34 Professor D'Amato argued that the Israeli attack was not
directed against Iraq's "territorial integrity" because Israel did not attempt to
alter Iraq's territorial boundaries. Nor did the Israeli attack threaten Iraq's
"political independence" because Israel's only purpose was to destroy the
reactor. Therefore, under a plain meaning approach to interpretation of Article
2(4), the only serious question is whether the attack was "inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations." Professor D'Amato contended that "[t]he
destructive potential of nuclear weapons is so enormous as to call into question
any and all received rules of international law regarding the trans-boundary use
of force."3 Thus, even though the Israeli attack would otherwise be inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations, the attack might be justified as a
means of preventing Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons.36
The central difficulty with this argument is that it views Article 2(4) in
isolation from Article 51, which provides that the Charter shall not "impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations."3 There is no doubt that the Israeli
attack on the Iraqi reactor was an "armed attack" within the meaning of Article
51. Therefore, the Israeli attack triggered Iraq's right to respond in self-defense.

31
32
33
34
35
36
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See, for example, Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 80-86 (Cambridge 3d ed
2001).
See Ian Brownlie, InternationalLaw and the Use of Force by States 265-68 (Oxford 1963).
See AlMilitay and ParamilitaryActivities (Nicar v US), 1986 ICJ 14, 98-106, 118-123 (June 27);
Co~fu Channel (UK vAlb), 1949 ICJ 4, 32-35 (Apr 9).
Anthony D'Amato, Israel'sAir Strike Upon the IraqiNuclear Reactor, 77 Am J Intl L 584 (1983).
Id at 588.
The Osiraq reactor, which Israel destroyed, was not an efficient plutonium producer because
it required enriched uranium fuel. See Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear
Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 187 (Westview 1990). Even so, Iraq could
have used the reactor to produce approximately 2-8 kg of plutonium annually. See David
Albright, Iraq'sProgramsto Make Highly Enriched Uraniumand Plutoniumfor Nuclear Weapons Prior
to the Gulf War, available online at <http://www.isis-online.org/publicadions/iraq/iraqs-fmhistory.html> (visited Mar 2, 2003).
United Nations Charter, art 51.
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Customary international law requires that steps taken. in self-defense be
necessary and proportionate to the initial attack. If Iraq had responded by using
conventional weapons to attack a single military target in Israel, that would
certainly have been a proportionate response, assuming that Iraq took steps to
minimize civilian casualties. Of course, an Iraqi attack against a target in Israel
would also be an armed attack, which would trigger Israel's right of self-defense,
and so on ad infinitum. In short, Professor D'Amato's logic collapses of its own
weight because it provides justification for an endless cycle of legal attacks and
counterattacks. That is directly contrary to the central purpose of the UN
Charter: "[t]o maintain international peace and security, and ...
to bring about by
peaceful means ...
settlement of international disputes or situations which might
lead to a breach of the peace."38
Advocates of the narrow interpretation might advance one of two
arguments. One approach would be to adopt a narrow interpretation of the
phrase "armed attack" in Article 51, such that any use of force that is legal under
Article 2(4) is, by definition, not an "armed attack." A second approach would
hold that whenever State X launches an armed attack against State Y that is
justified under a narrow interpretation of Article 2(4), and State Y exercises its
right of self-defense by launching an armed attack against State X, State X has
no further right to respond in self-defense because State X effectively exercised
its right of self-defense in advance. Neither argument is entirely without merit.
However, the practical reality is that it is exceedingly difficult to check the
escalation of violence once it has been initiated. That is why the drafters of the
UN Charter attempted to draw a legal line to prevent the initiation of violence,
rather than attempting to prevent the escalation of violence. An interpretive
approach that authorizes the first use of armed force, and then prohibits the
subsequent use of armed force, is doomed to fail because political leaders will
heed generals, not lawyers, when responding to an armed attack.
In sum, although there is merit to the argument for a narrow
interpretation, Article 2(4) cannot be construed so narrowly as to exclude from
its scope a use of military force that would constitute an "armed attack" under
Article 51 because that would justify an endless cycle of attack and
counterattack.39 Moreover, any use of military force by one state to destroy a

38

Id at art 1(1).
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Not every "use of force" within the meaning of Article 2(4) is an "armed attack" within the
meaning of Article 51. For example, in 1976 Israeli forces conducted a rescue mission in
Uganda to secure the release of hostages who had been passengers on an Air France plane
that was hijacked by terrorists and taken to Entebbe airport in Uganda. See Dinstein, War,
Aggression and Self-Defence at 205-07 (cited in note 31). Even though the Entebbe raid was a
transboundary use of force, commentators generally agree that it was not an "armed attack"
that gave rise to a Ugandan right of self-defense. In this author's view, the Entebbe raid was
not prohibited by Article 2(4) because it was not directed against the territorial integrity or
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nuclear facility on the territory of another state necessarily qualifies as an "armed
attack" under Article 51. Therefore, absent Security Council authorization,
Article 2(4) prohibits the use of military force by one state to destroy a nuclear
facility on the territory of another state, unless the attacking state can legitimately
claim to be acting in self-defense.
B. ARTICLE 51 AND THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
As with Article 2(4), academic commentary on Article 51 tends to be split
between broad and narrow interpretations. The narrow interpretation of Article
51 is based upon the text of the Charter, which refers to the right of self-defense
"if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations."4 Based on
this language, advocates of the narrow interpretation contend that the Charter
prohibits the use of force in self-defense until after an armed attack has already
occurred. Under the narrow interpretation, preemptive attacks against nuclear
facilities can never be justified as acts of self-defense. Rather, a state that fears its
adversary's emerging nuclear capability must wait for the adversary to attack
before exercising its right of self-defense.
Advocates of the broad interpretation contend that Article 51 was not
intended to limit the preexisting customary right of self-defense. In support of
this view, they note that the Charter refers to "the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence." Pre-Charter customary law condoned acts of
anticipatory self-defense in cases where "the necessity of that self-defence is
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation."'" Thus, under pre-Charter customary law, a state could exercise its
right of self-defense before its enemy attacked if the threat of an attack was
imminent. However, the imminence requirement, as traditionally understood,
would preclude launching preemptive attacks on nuclear facilities at the optimal
time-that is, before nuclear material is introduced into a facility-because preCharter customary law authorized acts of anticipatory self-defense only to
address the imminent threat of an attack, not to address the development of a
new military capability. 42 Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, if a state

political independence of Uganda, nor was it otherwise inconsistent with the purposes of the
40
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United Nations.
United Nations Charter, art 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.").
John Bassett Moore, 2 A Digest of InternationalLaw § 217, at 412 (GPO 1906) (quoting
correspondence between Mr. Webster, the US Secretary of State, and Lord Ashburton, the
British plenipotentiary, in relation to the famous Caroline incident).
See, for example, Brownlie, InternationalLaw and the Use of Force by States at 231-50 (cited in
note 32).

Spnng 2003

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

waits until the threat of a nuclear attack is imminent, a preemptive attack against
the adversary's nuclear facilities is unlikely to be an attractive military option.
Recognizing this dilemma, some commentators have argued that the
traditional imminence requirement must be relaxed in order to account for the
unique threat posed by nuclear weapons. Given the tremendous destructive
potential of nuclear weapons, one could argue, the production of HEU or
separated plutonium by an adversary is itself a significant threat. Therefore,
when it becomes clear that an adversary will soon commence production of
HEU or separated plutonium, the threat is sufficiently imminent that a
43
preemptive attack can be justified as an act of anticipatory self-defense.
In this author's judgment, the preceding argument provides a compelling
justification for preemptive action by the UN Security Council. However, if
framed as a legal rationale for unilateral acts of anticipatory self-defense, the
argument suffers from one serious flaw: it fails to account for the fact that the
UN Charter embodies a strong preference for collective action under Security
Council auspices, rather than individual (or even collective) self-defense that is
not authorized by the Security Council. There is wisdom underlying this
approach. The Charter imposes strict legal constraints on the unilateral use of
force because the drafters recognized that acts of violence usually beget further
violence. By insisting on the requirement of Security Council authorization
before initiating armed conflict, the drafters incorporated a significant political
safeguard into the legal regime governing the use of force. Given the structure
and composition of the Security Council, it is politically difficult to obtain
Security Council authorization for the use of armed force. That political
difficulty is deliberate-it is meant to ensure that states do not initiate armed
conflict without strong justification.
Critics contend that the Charter framework is flawed because it prohibits
states from using armed force unilaterally even in cases where the use of force is
both necessary and morally justified. There are two responses to this argument.
First, in cases where political leaders believe that unilateral military action is both
necessary and morally justified, they will authorize the use of armed force
regardless of whether it is legally prohibited. Even so, the legal prohibition is
valuable because it encourages political leaders to consider other potential
options before initiating unilateral military action.44 Second, with respect to the
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Several commentators have advanced arguments along these lines. See, for example, Mark E.
Newcomb, Non-Prolferation, Self-Defense, and the Korean Crisis, 27 Vand J Transnad L 603
(1994); Colonel Guy B. Roberts, The CounteroroiferationSelf-Help Paradigm:A Legal Regime for
Enfordng the Norm Prohibitingthe Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 Deny J Ind L &
Poly 483 (1999); Roger K. Smith, The Legality of Coercive Arms Control, 19 Yale J Ind L 455
(1994).
Consider the analogy to highway speed limits. Drivers routinely violate the law by driving
faster than the speed limit. Even so, speed limits are useful because they reduce the number
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specific problem at issue here-the production of HEU and/or separated
plutonium by a state that has not previously acquired a stockpile of weaponsgrade nuclear materials-unilateral action is neither necessary nor justified
because the Security Council can address the threat. Part IV discusses Security
Council action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
IV. A POLICY PRESCRIPTION
Three points emerge from the preceding discussion. First, there is a strong
policy argument in favor of a preemptive attack against a plutonium production
reactor, reprocessing plant, and/or uranium enrichment facility in a state that
has not previously produced a stockpile of weapons-grade nuclear material.
Second, the optimal time for a preemptive attack is shortly before nuclear
material is introduced into the facility. Third, under the UN Charter, any such
preemptive attack would be a violation of international law unless authorized by
the Security Council.
In light of the above, the five permanent members of the Security Council
should issue a joint policy declaration along the following lines:
Whereas the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty accords the United States,
Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom the legal status of "nuclear
weapon states";
Whereas Israel, India, and Pakistan are widely assumed to be "de facto"
nuclear weapon states;
Whereas North Korea also appears to be close to acquiring a nuclear
5
weapons capability;
Whereas the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional states would pose
a substantial threat to international peace and security;
Whereas the five permanent members of the Security Council have a special
responsibility under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace
and security;
The undersigned governments hereby declare as follows:
1. We will work together to persuade states (other than those named
above) to refrain from building, or attempting to build, plutonium production
reactors, reprocessing plants, and/or uranium enrichment facilities, unless the

45

of accidents by providing an incentive for drivers to proceed more slowly than they would in
the absence of speed limits. Similarly, assuming that states frequently violate international
legal rules governing the use of armed force (and that proposition is debatable, as an
empirical matter), those rules serve a useful function because they encourage states to adopt a
more cautious approach to the use of armed force than they would in the absence of such
legal rules.
The question of how best to handle North Korea is the most politically delicate problem
raised by the proposed declaration. Different approaches are possible, but if the declaration
is to have any chance of success it will have to treat North Korea as a special case.
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Security Council determines that a particular state with an advanced civilian
nuclear power program has a demonstrated need for an enrichment or
reprocessing capability;46
2. If we are unable to persuade a particular state to refrain from building, or
attempting to build, a plutonium production reactor, reprocessing plant, or
uranium enrichment facility, we will work together to obtain Security Council
authorization for a preemptive attack against such a facility, unless that state can
persuade us that the subject facility is not a threat to the peace;"
3. To allow the maximum possible time for peaceful resolution of disputes,
we will not support an attack against such a facility unless or until construction
of the facility is nearing completion;
4. To avoid the serious radiological damage that would likely result from an
attack against an operational facility, we will support preemptive attacks before
nuclear material is introduced into such a facility.
The primary targets of the proposed declaration are potential future
nuclear proliferators, including states such as Iran, Libya, and Algeria. Current
nonproliferation strategy with respect to those states relies on export controls on
the supply side and diplomacy on the demand side. The proposed declaration
would add a third prong to the strategy. Hopefully, the threat of a preemptive
attack would dissuade states from attempting to produce nuclear weapons. But if
states ignored the threat, a well-executed strike against nuclear material
production facilities would prevent a potential proliferator from producing
weapons-grade nuclear material.
It bears emphasis that the proposed declaration does not address the
nuclear proliferation risks associated with the Israeli, Indian, Pakistani, or North
Korean nuclear programs. The option of launching a preemptive attack against
Israel, India, or Pakistan does not even merit serious discussion. Some believe
that a preemptive attack against North Korea is still a viable option. The
proposed declaration would not preclude the possibility of a preemptive attack
against North Korean facilities, but the declaration recognizes that North Korea
is a unique case that requires special treatment.
Ten or fifteen years ago, this type of joint policy declaration would have
been unthinkable. But recent political developments suggest that such a joint
declaration may now be politically feasible. In one sense, the proposed
declaration builds on recent experience with Iraq, where the Security Council, in
response to strong US leadership, has adopted a muscular approach to
46
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The final clause is necessary because there are some states, such as Japan and Germany, that
have a legitimate reason for developing enrichment and/or reprocessing capabilities in the
context of their civilian nuclear power programs.
This formulation is intended to secure agreement on the general principle, while still
preserving flexibility for the Security Council and its permanent members to make case-bycase determinations as particular situations develop.
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enforcement of nonproliferation norms. 4' More directly on point, though, are
the parallel unilateral declarations issued by the five nuclear weapon states in
1995, in the context of extending the NPT. At that time, each of the five nuclear
weapon states announced (with slight variations in wording) that it would work
through the Security Council to provide immediate assistance to any nonnuclear-weapon state party to the NPT that was threatened with a nuclear attack.
The Security Council, in turn, welcomed "the intention expressed by certain
States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with
the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act
of, or an object of a
49
threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.,
Of course, the proposed declaration goes further in that it promises a
definite, forceful response to a specific type of nuclear threat, whereas the
parallel statements issued in 1995 merely offered a vague promise of assistance
inaddressing nuclear threats generally. Even so, there is sufficient diplomatic
precedent that, with strong US leadership, it should be possible to reach
agreement on something like the proposed joint policy declaration. If China
ultimately refuses to cooperate, it would still be helpful to reach agreement
among the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom.
V. CONCLUSION

In December 2002, President Bush announced a national strategy to
combat weapons of mass destruction ("WMD"). The Bush strategy states that
US military forces "must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed
adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures."' This
Article suggests that preemptive attacks against nuclear facilities may be
appropriate in some cases. However, President Bush's emphasis on unilateral
action, rather than multilateral action, may prove self-defeating in the long run,
because unilateral action is likely to foster additional anti-American sentiment. In
contrast to the President's unilateralism, this Article has proposed a joint policy
declaration by the five permanent members of the Security Council threatening
preemptive attacks against certain types of nuclear facilities. If adopted, the
proposed declaration would not be a panacea, but it would provide an additional
tool to help combat the threat of nuclear proliferation.
48
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See Security Council Res No 1441, UN Doc No S/RES/1441 (2002) (requiring Iraq to
provide international inspectors "immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any
and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of
transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and
private access to all officials and other persons" whom the inspectors choose to interview).
Security Council Res No 984, UN Doc No S/RES/984 (1995).
NationalStrategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Dec 2002), available online at <http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf> (visited Mar 2, 2003).
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